EU Pact on Migration and Asylum Opens Door to Uncontrolled Islamic Political Migration

The new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, adopted in 2024, reshapes how the EU manages asylum, border procedures and solidarity among Member States. It aims to reduce “irregular” arrivals, speed up procedures and share responsibility, but in practice it institutionalizes a permanent mechanism for large‑scale admissions and relocations into the EU. This framework can, even unintentionally, facilitate long‑term migration movements towards Europe, including hijra.

Hijra is Islamic political migration that emulates Mohammed’s immigration from Mecca to Medina. This specific type of migration is fully based on the Islamic political doctrine. It is a tactic of non-violent jihad that uses migration from Islamic to Kafir (non-Islamic) territory to expand the ideas as well as influence and power of Political Islam. It is the precursor to jihad.

Some people who migrate from Islamic countries into non-Islamic ones seek refuge because of the influence of Political Islam. They do not want to follow its principles and want to enjoy the freedoms offered by non-Islamic societies.

Often, because of their inability to speak the language of the host country, these people end up under the influence of local Islamic organizations. They find that Political Islam, which they were initially running away from, is in full power in the non-Islamic country they escaped to. This makes it very hard for them to break out of fear of Islamic (including capital) punishments for apostasy. Doctrinal texts describing such penalties are widely distributed across non-Islamic countries with limited or no restrictions.

The Pact is a package of EU regulations and directives replacing the previous “Dublin” system. Key elements include: mandatory border screening and accelerated asylum/border procedures at the external frontier; a “solidarity mechanism”: Member States must either relocate a quota of asylum seekers, sponsor returns, or pay financial contributions (EUR 20,000 per person per year); stronger Eurodac database and expanded use of detention at borders; and a permanent, legally binding structure for managing recurring migration flows, instead of ad‑hoc crisis responses.

Although the Pact does not mention hijra, it nevertheless facilitates it in several ways:

• It locks-in a permanent legal pathway: a stable system of reception, relocation and regularization of large numbers of non-EU nationals, many from Islamic states.
• It reduces the ability of individual Member States to unilaterally close borders or refuse relocations, thereby guaranteeing that entry via any external frontier can lead to distribution across the EU.
• It creates predictability for transnational networks (including jihadi organizations) that can plan long‑term “migration corridors” knowing that arrivals will be processed and redistributed rather than systematically rejected and removed.
• It does not contain any filter capable of addressing ideological imports (including anti‑liberal, anti‑Jewish, anti‑Christian or anti‑democratic agendas, which Political Islam represents) embedded in migration streams; the Pact’s tools are administrative (asylum criteria, vulnerability, return), not civilizational.

Current Migration Situation according to The European Annual Asylum and Migration Report of 11.11.2025:

• Irregular arrivals by sea and land remain well above the low levels seen around 2015–2016 after the peak crisis, with renewed pressure on the Central Mediterranean, Western Balkans and Atlantic routes.
• A significant share of arrivals continues to come from Islamic states in North Africa, the Sahel, the Middle East, and South Asia.
• Return rates of rejected applicants remain low, meaning many de facto stay in the EU.
• Several Member States report persistent integration problems, parallel societies, and security concerns, especially in urban areas with high concentrations of recent migrants.

The COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION of 11.11.2025 identifies some Member States as follows:

1. Current Pressure (Group 1): States currently under migratory pressure. These are primarily front-line nations managing external borders and immediate arrivals (Italy, Greece, Spain, Cyprus). They are entitled to use the Annual Solidarity Pool or to request deduction of pledged contributions. These states become institutionalized as high‑volume intake and triage zones for flows that are then redistributed across Europe.
2. Potential Future Pressure (Group 2): States at risk of migratory pressure. These countries are not currently overwhelmed but face high probability of future pressure due to transit routes or geopolitical shifts (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, France, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Finland). They are entitled to use the Annual Solidarity Pool or to request deduction of pledged contributions. Though currently less affected, they commit to future obligations if routes or political decisions shift; their bargaining position will weaken over time as the Pact becomes routine.
3. Cumulative Historical Pressure (Group 3): States with a significant migratory situation. These nations are dealing with the long-term accumulation of migrants and secondary movements (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Croatia, Austria, Poland). They may request reductions of their solidarity contributions due to a significant migratory situation over the last five years. These states will remain the structural “end‑points” of many migration trajectories, including those motivated by hijra, unless they fundamentally rethink both EU‑level rules and their domestic integration models.

This identification is based on the European Annual Asylum and Migration Report of 11.11.2025, using a specific methodology that compares each Member State’s situation to the overall situation in the Union in order to determine “disproportionate obligations.”

Note: Some Member States appear in multiple categories (Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Poland are both "at risk of migratory pressure" and "facing significant migratory situation").

The Member States that do not belong to any of the 3 groups are: Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. These countries must comply with all obligations in full without any specific exemptions. Only Denmark is not taking part in the adoption of this Decision and is not bound by it or subject to its application.

Conclusion:
The 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum is presented as a technical solution to “irregular migration,” but in reality, it is a long‑term framework that normalizes high‑volume entry, regularization and redistribution of non‑EU nationals across Europe. By providing predictability and legal continuity, it indirectly supports organized long‑term migration movements into the EU, including those inspired by civilizational concepts such as hijra, while lacking any specific instruments to filter or counter ideological projects embedded in these flows.